RECEIVED CENTRAL FAX CENTER

MAY 0 6 2005

PTO/SB/21 (09-04)
Approved for use through 07/31/2008, OMB 0851-0031

→ PTO MAIN FAX

U.S. Petent and Tredemark Office; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number.				
(Application Number	10/694,	10/694,287	
TRANSMITTAL	Filing Date	October 27, 2003		
FORM	First Named Inventor	Reiner	Reiner Rygiel	
	Art Unit	2872		
(to be used for all correspondence after initial filing)	Examiner Name	Pritchett, Joshua L.		
Total Number of Pages in This Submission 6	Attorney Docket Number	21295.65 (H56		JS)
ENCLOSURES (Check ell that apply) After Allowance Communication to TC				
Fee Transmittal Form	Drawing(s)			Allowarios Communication to TC
Fee Attached	Licensing-related Papers	-related Papers		eel Communication to Board opeals and Interferences
Amendment/Repty	etition			eal Communication to TC eal Notice, Brief, Reply Brief)
	Petition to Convert to a			rietary information
	Provisional Application Power of Attorney, Revocation	on .		-
Affidavits/declaration(s)	Change of Correspondence	nange of Correspondence Address		is Letter r Enclosure(s) (please Identify
Extension of Time Request	Terminal Disclaimer		belo	
Express Abendonment Request	Request for Refund		·	
Information Disclosure Statement	CD, Number of CD(s)			
	Landscape Table on CI	D		
Certified Copy of Priority Remarks				
Document(s) Reply to Missing Parts/				
Incomplete Application				
Reply to Missing Parts under 37 CFR 1.52 or 1.53			* .	
SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT, ATTORNEY, OR AGENT				
Firm Name				
Houston Eliseeva LLP				
Signature Wars Elsewe				
Printed name Maria M. Eliseeva				
Date May 6, 2005		Reg. No.	43,328	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMISSION/MAILING				
I hereby certify that this correspondence is being facsimile transmitted to the USPTO or deposited with the United States Postal Service with sufficient postage as first class mall in an envelope addressed to: Commissioner for Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450 on the date shows before:				
Signature Clause of Handalean				
Data Maria Coop				
Typed or printed name Claire J. Handalian May 6, 2005				

This collection of information is required by 37 CFR 1.5. The information is required to obtain or retain a benefit by the public which is to file (and by the USPTO to process) an application. Confidentiality is governed by 35 U.S.C. 122 and 37 CFR 1.11 and 1.14. This collection is estimated to 2 hours to complete, including gathering, preparing, and submitting the completed application form to the USPTO. This will vary depending upon the Individual case. Any comments on the amount of time you require to complete this form and/or suggestions for reducing this burden, should be sent to the Chief Information Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450, DO NOT SEND FEES OR COMPLETED FORMS TO THIS ADDRESS. SEND TO: Commissioner for Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450.

If you need assistance in completing the form, call 1-800-PTO-9199 and select option 2.

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In Re:

Reiner Rygiel

Confirmation No:

2780

RECEIVED
CENTRAL FAX CENTER

Serial No:

10/694,1087

Group:

2872

MAY 0 6 2005

Filed:

October 27, 2003

Examiner:

Pritchett,

Joshua L.

For:

Sample Carrier for a Confocal Microscope, and Method for

Fabricating a Sample Carrier

Customer No.:

29127

Attorney

21295.65 (H5680US)

Docket No.

RESPONSE TO RESTRICTION REQUIREMENT

VIA FACSIMILE: 703-872-9306

Mail Stop: Amendment Commissioner for Patents

P.O. Box 1450

Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450

Sir:

In response to the Office Action mailed April 6, 2005, Applicant hereby makes the following election:

Applicant elects Claims 1-13.

Applicant also respectfully traverses the grounds of the present restriction requirement and wishes to place the application in better condition to appeal the restriction requirement.

21003/006

Application No.: 10/694,287 Amendment dated: May 6, 2005 Reply to Office Action of April 6, 2005 Attorney Docket No.: 21295.65 (H5680US)

The Examiner has stated:

"Restriction to one of the following inventions is required under 35 U.S.C 121:

- I. Claims 1-13, drawn to a sample carrier for a confocal microscope, classified in class 359, subclass 391.
- II. Claims 14-19, drawn to a method of making a sample carrier for a confocal microscope, classified in class 359, subclass 398.

The inventions are distinct, each from the other because of the following reasons:

Inventions II and I are related as process of making and product made. The inventions are distinct if either or both of the following are shown: (1) that the process as claimed can be used to make other or materially different product or (2) that the product as claimed can be made by another materially different process (MPEP 806.05(f)). In the instant case the product can be made by a process different than the claimed method, which includes using an aqueous solution, drying a coverslip and matching of refractive indices.

Because these inventions are distinct for the reasons given above and have acquired a separate status in the art as shown by their different classification, restriction for examination purposes as indicated is proper."

What 35 U.S.C. 121, the law, states in relevant part is: "If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions." Note that 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.141 and 1.142 also speak of "independent and distinct" inventions. The Examiner has only argued that the inventions are distinct. The Examiner has not also argued, as required by 35 U.S.C. 121, that the inventions are also independent. Therefore, the restriction requirement is improper and Applicant requests that it be withdrawn.

Note that Applicant does not consider the explanation of the meaning of "independent" and "distinct" in MPEP § 802 persuasive.

The MPEP §802.01 Meaning of "Independent" and "Distinct":

"35 U.S.C. 121 quoted in the preceding section states that the Commissioner may require restriction if two or more "independent and distinct" inventions are claimed in one application. In 37 CFR 1.141, the statement is made that two or more "independent and distinct inventions" may not be claimed in one application.

Application No.: 10/694,287 Amendment dated: May 6, 2005 Reply to Office Action of April 6, 2005 Attorney Docket No.: 21295.65 (H5680US)

This raises the question of the subjects as between which the Commissioner may require restriction. This, in turn, depends on the construction of the expression "independent and distinct" inventions.

"Independent", of course, means not dependent. If "distinct" means the same thing, then its use in the statute and in the rule is redundant. If "distinct" means something different, then the question arises as to what the difference in meaning between these two words may be. The hearings before the committees of Congress considering the codification of the patent laws indicate that 35 U.S.C. 121: "enacts as law existing practice with respect to division, at the same time introducing a number of changes."

The report on the hearings does not mention as a change that is introduced, the subjects between which the Commissioner may properly require division.

The term "independent" as already pointed out, means not dependent. A large number of subjects between which, prior to the 1952 Act, division had been proper, are dependent subjects, such as, for example, combination and a subcombination thereof; as process and apparatus used in the practice of the process; as composition and the process in which the composition is used; as process and the product made by such process, etc. If section 121 of the 1952 Act were intended to direct the Commissioner never to approve division between dependent inventions, the word "independent" would clearly have been used alone. If the Commissioner has authority or discretion to restrict independent inventions only, then restriction would be improper as between dependent inventions, e.g., the examples used for purpose of illustration above. Such was clearly not the intent of Congress. Nothing in the language of the statute and nothing in the hearings of the committees indicate any intent to change the substantive law on this subject. On the contrary, joinder of the term "distinct" with the term "independent", indicates lack of such intent. The law has long been established that dependent inventions (frequently termed related inventions) such as used for illustration above may be properly divided if they are, in fact,"distinct" inventions, even though dependent.

INDEPENDENT

The term "independent" (i.e., not dependent) means that there is no disclosed relationship between the two or more subjects disclosed, that is, they are unconnected in design, operation, or effect, for example: (1) species under a genus which species are not usable together as disclosed; or (2) process and apparatus incapable of being used in practicing the process.

Application No.: 10/694,287 Amendment dated: May 6, 2005 Reply to Office Action of April 6, 2005 Attorney Docket No.: 21295.65 (H5680US)

DISTINCT

The term "distinct" means that two or more subjects as disclosed are related, for example, as combination and part (subcombination) thereof, process and apparatus for its practice, process and product made, etc., but are capable of separate manufacture, use, or sale as claimed, AND ARE PATENTABLE (novel and unobvious) OVER EACH OTHER (though they may each be unpatentable because of the prior art). It will be noted that in this definition the term related is used as an alternative for dependent in referring to subjects other than independent subjects.

It is further noted that the terms "independent" and "distinct" are used in decisions with varying meanings. All decisions should be read carefully to determine the meaning intended."

The arguments presented in the MPEP seem to rest on two pillars:

- 1) Apparently, the novel statutory construction theory being put forward is that in the absence of legislative history on a given point, the law doesn't mean what the law says. Applicant submits that the statutory construction as described by the Supreme Court should be given deference: "[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." \(^1\) Certainly, "[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.' " Id.
- 2) "Independent and distinct" has the same meaning as "distinct." This is a logical impossibility if "independent" and "distinct" have different definitions, yet MPEP § 802.01 concedes that that they do have different definitions and helpfully provides them.

Therefore, the applicants suggest that the Examiner has not satisfied 35 U.S.C 121 in the restriction requirement. If the Examiner wishes to maintain the restriction requirement, the

¹ Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).

Application No.: 10/694,287 Amendment dated: May 6, 2005 Reply to Office Action of April 6, 2005 Attorney Docket No.: 21295.65 (H5680US)

Applicant respectfully requests that the Examiner also explain how the subject matter represents two "independent" inventions, according to the definition of "independent" given in MPEP § 802.01.

Dated: May 6, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

HOUSTON ELISEEVA LLP

Maria M. Eliseeva, Reg. No. 43,328

Customer No. 29127 4 Militia Drive, Ste. 4 Lexington, MA 02421

Tel: 781-863-9991 Fax: 781-863-9931